AEU Longshore Blog ISSUE: Review of Status, Part Two: Construction Workers, Mail Clerks, and Truck Drivers, Foreign Workers and Bridge Workers

This is Part Two of a compilation of occupation-specific status discussions from past AEU Longshore blog postings.


Construction Workers

A few years back, we covered the Longshore Act status of construction workers.  These are workers who build, repair, renovate, or maintain buildings and equipment.  They are welders, electricians, roofers, sheet metal workers, carpenters, plumbers, etc.  They work on shipyard and terminal buildings at maritime locations as well as office and industrial buildings nowhere near any navigable water.  The problem is determining when these workers may be covered by the Longshore Act.

This is a status discussion, so let’s assume that the workers meet situs for Longshore Act coverage.

Construction work can be maritime employment based on the location and timing of the work and the nature, purpose, and use of the structures being worked on.

First, the structure must have a maritime purpose.  Construction work does not meet maritime status simply because it is done on a maritime situs.  The building or structure has to have a maritime connection, integral or essential to the loading/unloading of cargo, shipbuilding, ship repair or ship breaking.

Second, there’s a timing element.  The nature of the building, structure, equipment, etc. being built, maintained, renovated, or repaired has to be related to concurrent maritime activity.  Future intended maritime use may not be enough to confer status.

Two case examples illustrate this point:

  1. A pipefitter building a power plant at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard failed to meet Longshore Act status. Although the plant would eventually provide steam and electricity to shipbuilding operations, at the time that the claimant was on the site it was new construction and the building had never performed a maritime function.  When the job was finished the claimant would have been off the site and on to another construction project (Weyher/Livsey Constructors Inc. v. Prevetire, (27 F.3d 985 (4th 1994)).
  2. However, two maintenance workers at that same power plant at a later date did meet status. At the time of their injuries, the plant was operating and the steam and electricity were going to supply shipyard operations.  The employees were maintaining an operating, essential maritime facility, (Kerby v. Southeastern Public Service Authority, (31 BRBS 6 (1997)).

When it comes to coverage issues with regard to construction workers, the best approach is to analyze the timing and nature of the project looking for an essential maritime connection.


Mail Clerks and Truck Drivers

In the past, we have also addressed in general terms the coverage issues related to the maritime status of mail clerks and truck drivers (see parts one and two of that discussion).  This included consideration of the “vendor exclusion” of section 2(3)(D) as it may apply to truck drivers.  This exclusion is narrower than generally believed, therefore it may be worth revisiting those discussions.

About a year ago, we reviewed a then-new truck driver case of Abdulaziz A. Ahmed v. Western Ports Transportation, Inc., (BRB No. 16-0067, 9/21/16).  This decision contains a good discussion of the issues of situs as well as status.

In addressing the status issue, the BRB reviewed a number of its prior truck driver cases.  It considered several situations where drivers, much like the driver in this case, transported cargo between port terminals and facilities located outside the port.  These drivers were involved in the land-based stream of commerce rather than cargo handling. The key point is that the drivers were transporting sealed containers, loaded onto the trucks by others, to destinations outside the port area.  Since the driver in this case was transporting containers between the port and an inland intermodal facility, he was involved in land transportation and did not meet status under the Longshore Act.


Special Status

An example of a special status issue is the situation where status is actually irrelevant.  On several occasions, notably on September 23, 2010 and January 27, 2015, the AEU Longshore Blog referenced Perini coverage.  It’s a very simple principle.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, any work over the navigable waters of the United States is covered by the Longshore Act, unless an express statutory exclusion applies.  Situs over the water confers status; the nature of the work doesn’t matter.


Foreign Workers

The Longshore Act status of foreign workers has also been discussed on several prior occasions, notably on February 14, 2012 and July 1, 2015.  The coverage provisions of the Act, sections 2(3) (status) and 3(a) (situs), comprise the tests for coverage.  With the exception of the section 3(b) exclusion of employees of a foreign government, there is no nationality or citizenship component to Longshore Act coverage.

For example, if a domestic U.S. company hires foreign workers to work in the U.S., either permanently or temporarily, these workers are covered if they meet Longshore Act status and situs.  Likewise, if a foreign company sends employees to work in the U.S. these workers are also covered if they meet situs and status.

In the July 1, 2015 post, the point was made that the same considerations also apply to workers in the U.S. illegally.  The definition and coverage provisions in the Longshore Act do not contain citizenship, nationality, or immigration status conditions.


Bridge Workers

Cases involving bridge workers involve issues of both situs and status, as we discussed back on July 13, 2010.  Status is usually a secondary consideration in bridge cases.  If you meet the situs element for coverage then you will often satisfy status by virtue of Perini (work over the water) coverage.

Work on a bridge does not usually meet situs since bridges are considered extensions of land and are not “enumerated sites” under section 3(a).  Situs issues usually include instances where the worker is not working on the bridge itself but from a barge or work platform (watch out for MEL exposure here), or where the bridge is incomplete, or the bridge is floating, not permanently affixed to land, or any number of circumstances which affect the question of whether the bridge is permanently affixed to land.

But back to status. If the worker meets situs and Perini doesn’t apply because the injury does not occur over the water then you have to sort out status.

Is work on a bridge considered maritime employment?  You need a strong maritime connection to have an argument for Longshore coverage.  For example, what effect will the work have on water borne commerce?  If you can make a strong argument that the purpose of the work is to aid, regulate, or otherwise influence maritime commerce, such as work on a drawbridge that will improve the flow of commerce, then you may have status.  In some federal circuits if you are unloading construction materials at the job site this may give you status.

Conclusion: Work on completed bridges permanently affixed to land is not generally considered to meet situs or status under the Longshore Act, but all facts should be considered for any duties or circumstances that could implicate Longshore coverage.  For example, is the worker loading and unloading construction materials from vessels, or is he working from a floating work platform or barge?  Might he be considered a “harbor worker”, based on the effect of his work on water borne commerce?  One must look closely at all circumstances before concluding that bridge work is not covered by the Longshore Act. We’ll cover the various nuances of bridge worker coverage in an upcoming post.



John A. (Jack) Martone served for 27 years in the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, as the Chief, Branch of Insurance, Financial Management, and Assessments and Acting Director, Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation. Jack joined The American Equity Underwriters, Inc. (AEU) in 2006, where he serves as Senior Vice President, AEU Advisory Services and is the moderator of the AEU Longshore Blog.

AEU Longshore Blog ISSUE: Review of Status, Part One: Truck Drivers, Nurses, Railroad Workers, Security Guards, and Safety Managers

Coverage questions about maritime “status” under the Longshore Act arise regularly, and the AEU Longshore Blog has addressed different occupations in various posts.  Most recently we have discussed the “clerical exclusion” and the maritime status of salesmen and estimators.

Following is a compilation of other occupation-specific status discussions from past blogs.  For more information, please refer to the original posts linked below.

First, a review of “status”:  A worker satisfies the status requirement of Section 2(3) (33 U.S.C. 902(3)) if he is an employee engaged in work which is integral or essential to the loading, unloading, construction, repair, or dismantling of vessels.  To satisfy this requirement the employee need only spend some of his time in covered operations.  There is no moment of injury test; status is determined by the overall nature of the employee’s duties.

Status is not limited to those employees who directly load/unload cargo, or build or repair vessels.  Workers who build, repair or maintain the buildings, facilities, and equipment involved in these operations are also covered.

Shipyard Nurses

For a review of status of shipyard nurses, the case of Lucille Galinas v. Electric Boat Corp is a good example.  The claimant’s duties consisted of treating injured employees at the employer’s shipyard medical clinic, responding to ambulance calls in the shipyard, performing physical examinations, audiograms, and EKGs, stocking RADCON (radiological controls) supplies, and participating in RADCON training drills.  The issue was whether this claimant’s duties met status for Longshore Act coverage as integral or essential to the employer’s shipbuilding operations.  The U.S. Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board (BRB) found that she did not meet the status test for coverage.

While the nurse’s duties were certainly important and useful to the employer, the non-performance of those duties did not have the potential to directly interrupt or impede the ongoing maritime operations, so she was not a maritime employee covered under the Longshore Act.


Truck Drivers

Typically there are several steps involved in the process of loading/unloading cargo.  Containers or cargo in other forms come off ships, and are placed at dockside.  The cargo may then be moved by the same or different personnel into a warehouse or storage area.  It may then be emptied by the same or other workers, and again moved around the warehouse or storage area depending on the conditions of its storage and the timing of its delivery to the consignee.  Finally, it is moved to a railhead or trucking area for overland transportation and delivery.

The Longshore Act covers all of the employees involved in the series of intermediate activities up to the point at which the cargo is loaded for overland delivery (or vice versa in the other direction).  Truck drivers who move cargo around terminals and ports, or from one terminal or port to another, are covered by the Longshore Act.

The truck driver whose only duty is to drive the truck transporting cargo from the terminal directly to inland consignees is most likely not covered, as the loading/unloading process has stopped, and he or she is involved only in land transportation.



Coverage for divers is problematic.  They may be covered by the Longshore Act, by state act workers’ compensation, or they may qualify for the seamen’s remedies as members of the crew of a vessel.  Crewmember status was tested under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chandris v. Latsis, and described the “Uncertainty Zone” between the mutually exclusive Longshore Act and the Jones Act/General Maritime Law remedies.

Divers often have short-term assignments, mixed duties which can include loading/unloading, and vessel maintenance and repair, and work in a variety of locations ranging from docks and piers to the outer continental shelf to the high seas.

As previously reviewed, there are several examples of coverage situations for divers among the different remedies.  In the case of Chandris, it did not end on an optimistic note.  The conclusion was, “Due to the uncertainty inherent in coverage issues involving divers, the bad news is that maritime employers may find themselves fully insuring workers separately for mutually exclusive remedies.”


Railroad Workers

The same considerations of “status” apply to railroad workers as to any other employees, i.e., a worker whose duties are integral or essential to maritime activity has status for Longshore Act coverage.

In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Schwalb it was held that railroad workers who facilitate the loading or unloading of cargo – in this case, coal – onto vessels are covered by the Longshore Act, which is their exclusive remedy against their employer for workplace injuries.  This includes workers who maintain, repair, and generally clean up around the equipment used in the loading/unloading process.

Because the Longshore Act covers these workers, they do not have the railroad employee’s negligence tort remedy under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA).

In these railroad cases, it is necessary to identify the point at which land commerce (traditional railroad activity) ends and cargo handling begins.


Safety Directors and Claims Professionals

Does the Longshore Act cover shipyard and terminal safety and claims personnel?  Do they meet the integral or essential test for status?

Duties include accident investigation, inspection of equipment and procedures, regulatory compliance, employee training, maintenance of logs and schedules, possibly emergency medical duties, and handling medical, legal and administrative aspects of injury claims. 

Safety professionals could make a strong case for Longshore Act status, but that the claims staff would have a more difficult time establishing maritime status, since they typically first become involved only in the aftermath of operations that have resulted in an injury.  They are not in a position to interrupt or halt maritime operations.  Their jobs are important, but meeting the “essential” test for maritime status is unlikely.


Security Guards

Section 2(3)(A) of the Longshore Act excludes from coverage “individuals employed exclusively to perform office … security … work.”  In order to be excluded from Longshore Act coverage the “security guard” must do “security” work “exclusively” in an “office”.  This is a narrow exclusion.

An occupational analysis of typical security guard duties indicates that if they are on a covered situs then they may have a good argument for status.

The federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “… pervasive surveillance conducted by (security guards) on the pier and occasionally on board ship is essential to the longshoring operation” (Arbeeny v. McRoberts Protective Agency, 642 F.2nd 672 (1981)).  Based on this, many security guards have a good argument for status under the integral or essential test.

Duties along the lines of safety roles, fire watch, maintenance, cargo processing, or any work actually over the water strengthen the status case for security guards.


As with all of these status discussions, pay attention to the full range of actual job duties and not to the job title. Part Two of this post will include construction workers, bridge workers, and some unusual status situations.





John A. (Jack) Martone served for 27 years in the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, as the Chief, Branch of Insurance, Financial Management, and Assessments and Acting Director, Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation. Jack joined The American Equity Underwriters, Inc. (AEU) in 2006, where he serves as Senior Vice President, AEU Advisory Services and is the moderator of the AEU Longshore Blog.

AEU Longshore Blog ISSUE: Maritime “status” for “salespeople” and “estimators”

The question arose recently as to whether salespeople and estimators are covered under the Longshore Act.  This is a very imprecise and incomplete question, but it can be answered easily.  The answer is, “maybe.”

Ordinarily a question like this can only be addressed by asking an interminable number of context and background questions.  It may be useful to go through a “status” analysis of these two very broad occupational classifications, since it will require a consideration of a number of concepts central to the coverage issue of status.

But first we have to define what we mean by “salesperson” and “estimator”.

Salesperson means a person who sells goods and/or services.  It’s that simple.

Estimator, however, is more difficult.  Although it’s a somewhat vague noun, we can take it to mean one who evaluates and renders opinions as to value, time, and approximate charges for work to be done, and who performs appraisals, etc.  We will assume that our “estimator” is one who comes on to a maritime site to perform an estimate for someone seeking to perform work or assess condition.

For this discussion, we’ll assume that “situs” is met for Longshore Act coverage.  Now we can work through an analysis of whether salespeople and estimators meet “status”.

First, a very brief summary of broad general principles with regard to Longshore Act status:

  1. Status is determined by the overall nature of the worker’s duties, and the role of those duties in accomplishing, contributing to, facilitating, interrupting, impeding, and otherwise constituting a necessary part of cargo handling or shipbuilding/ship repair/shipbreaking.
  2. The test that is used is whether those job duties are essential or integral to traditional maritime activity such as cargo handling, shipbuilding, or ship repair.
  3. There is no moment of injury test for status. If any part of an employee’s regular duties is maritime in nature then he or she meets status for his entire employment, even if performing non-maritime work at the moment of injury.
  4. If an injury occurs while the employee is working over the navigable waters of the U.S., then he or she is covered by the Act unless an exclusion applies. The employee does not have to meet status for injuries over the water.

In order to determine whether or not salespeople and estimators may meet status, we’re going to have to separately consider several statutory provisions and coverage concepts.


Vendor Exclusion

First, let’s take the case of an injury to a salesperson or estimator that occurs while he or she is selling or estimating over the navigable waters of the United States.  We know from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates (Churchill), 459 U.S. 297 (1983) (so-called Perini coverage) that situs confers status, and an injury over the water is covered under the Act.  This was the basis of coverage for an electrical repair estimator on board a vessel in the case of Scott v. Tug Mate, Inc., 22 BRBS 164 (1989).

So injury over the water is covered, unless a statutory exclusion applies – and there is one that might apply.

Section 2(3)(D) of the Longshore Act states:

“Sec. 2(3) The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker …, but such term does not include –

(D) individuals who (i) are employed by suppliers, transporters, or vendors, (ii) are temporarily doing business on the premises of a (maritime employer), and (iii) are not engaged in work normally performed by employees of that employer under this Act.”

This exclusion only covers 1) employees of vendors, suppliers, and transporters 2) who come on to a maritime situs temporarily and 3) are not engaged in work normally performed by employees of that employer under the Act.

Note:  the condition for the application of the exclusion is that the worker is covered by the state’s workers’ compensation law.

Examples of workers excluded under section 2(3)(D) include employees selling a product, such as the salesperson of cellular telephone air time (Daul v. Petroleum Communications, Inc., 196 F.3d 611 (5th Cir. 1999)) and the truck driver employed by a transporter whose sole responsibility was to pick up, transport, and deliver containers of sealed cargo from a storage area outside of the maritime facility who never left the truck.

So, a salesperson or estimator who is injured while working over the navigable waters of the U.S. is covered under the Longshore Act, unless this “vendor exclusion” applies. Although this exclusion is narrower than generally believed, salespeople are prime candidates for exclusion, depending on the circumstances and job duties.  Estimators, though, are less likely to be excluded by section 2(3)(D).  First, they have to be employed by a vendor, supplier, or transporter.  This rules out application of the exclusion for most estimators, who are more likely to be employed by a ship repairer, construction firm, insurance company, surveyor, etc.

For any injury that occurs over the water and coverage is uncertain, it is best first to consider whether Perini coverage applies and then consider whether any of the statutory exclusions in section 2(3) may apply.

To summarize so far, salespeople and estimators are covered by the Longshore Act if they are injured while working over the navigable waters, unless an exclusion such as the vendor provision applies to them.


What if the injury occurs on land and no exclusion applies?

We’re still assuming that they are on a covered situs, either an enumerated site or another adjoining area customarily used for maritime employment under Section 3(a).  In this case, we fall back on the general test for status, i.e., the employee has at least some regular job duties that are integral or essential to maritime activity.

This is a familiar issue, and it involves the question of whether the non-performance of the job duties in question has the potential to impede or interrupt the ongoing maritime activity at the site.  Under this test, I think that finding Longshore Act status for salespeople or estimators, as we have defined them, would be a stretch.  Their jobs are important, but they would usually fall short of the integral or essential test.

There is a broad range of jobs that have been found to be helpful and convenient to the maritime employer, but not essential.  These include shipyard nurses, claims adjustors, courtesy van drivers, terminal mess hall cooks, and office custodians. In most cases, salespeople and estimators can be added to this list.

Of course, there are other circumstances that can affect the coverage determination.

What if the salesperson delivers products on board vessels and actually helps to store/install the products?  The fact that he or she stores or installs the products most likely rules out the vendor exclusion (since the salesperson is doing work normally done by employees of the maritime employer), and if Perini doesn’t apply (injury not actually over the water) may he or she meet status?

The case of Felt v. San Pedro Tomco, 25 BRBS 362 (1992) involved a salesperson who delivered cleaning supplies and equipment to vessels several times daily.  Status was denied in this case since the time spent leading and discussing deliveries was minimal and episodic compared to his overall duties.  But this case could go the other way with a small change in circumstances.


Here is the checklist for coverage for a salesperson or estimator:

  1. Does Perini apply, i.e., did the injury occur over the water?
  2. If so, does an exclusion, such as the vendor exclusion in section 2(3)(D), apply?
  3. If neither 1 nor 2 apply, then does the worker meet the integral or essential test for status?




John A. (Jack) Martone served for 27 years in the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, as the Chief, Branch of Insurance, Financial Management, and Assessments and Acting Director, Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation. Jack joined The American Equity Underwriters, Inc. (AEU) in 2006, where he serves as Senior Vice President, AEU Advisory Services and is the moderator of the AEU Longshore Blog.

ISSUE: Situs and Status in the Fifth Circuit

Jack_crop 72dpiA significant event in Longshore Act jurisprudence has just occurred.

The federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision on April 29, 2013, in the case of New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, et al. (Zepeda). The Fifth Circuit (states of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) overruled its own long standing, often cited, and influential precedent (Textports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester) on the issue of Longshore Act situs.

In reversing the decision of the Benefits Review Board that had awarded benefits to Mr. Zepeda and which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit’s appellate panel, the en banc Fifth Circuit reinterpreted language in Section 903(a) of the Longshore Act. “Adjoining” as in “… other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel”, no longer means “neighboring” or “in the vicinity of” navigable water.

Now in the Fifth Circuit, the interpretation of “adjoining” means “to lie next to” or “to be in contact with”. The Fifth Circuit has adopted the “plain language of the statute” interpretation as used by the Fourth Circuit (states of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina) as analyzed in Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.

The scope of Longshore Act situs in the Fifth Circuit has significantly narrowed.

The claimant in this case worked repairing and performing maintenance on cargo containers and chassis used in land, rail, and vessel transportation. He did not pick up or deliver the empty containers or fill them with cargo. He worked at a facility located about 300 yards from the water with a (non-maritime) bottling company located between his employer’s premises and the water. The property was not contiguous with the water at any point.

The issue was whether his job location met the situs requirement for Longshore Act coverage as an “other adjoining area” under Section 903(a).

The Administrative Law Judge, Benefits Review Board, and the Fifth circuit panel on appeal agreed that under the Fifth Circuit’s precedent in Winchester the location met the situs requirement as being close to or in the vicinity of navigable waters. Then the Fifth Circuit agreed to review the case en banc, i.e., by all the judges in the circuit as opposed to the usual 3 judge panel that hears appeals.

Note: in order to be covered by the Longshore Act an injured worker must meet a status and a situs requirement. These are separate elements and both must be satisfied separately.

Meeting the situs requirement for coverage involves satisfying two components – geographic and functional, i.e., where are you in relation to the navigable water and are you engaged in appropriate maritime activity in relation to that navigable water.

While recognizing that other circuits, such as the Ninth (states of Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii, etc.), Third (states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and U.S. Virgin Islands), and First (states of Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Puerto Rico) (and other circuits as well) still use a more expansive interpretation of “adjoining”, the Fifth Circuit in Zepeda has now belatedly (Winchester was decided in 1980) recognized that its precedents had set up vague instructions and provided little guidance to other courts or litigants on how to determine whether a claimant satisfies the situs test. Now, in the Fourth and Fifth federal circuits an “other adjoining area” must touch the water.

Note: This new interpretation of “adjoining area” does not refer to the point of the injury, but to the employer’s overall facility or premises.

So, the geographic element of situs just got simpler in the Fifth Circuit.

If the en banc court had stopped there the ruling would have been sufficient to reverse the Board’s decision, since if either situs or status is not met then there is no entitlement. But the first of two Concurring opinions discusses the status element in this case to produce an alternative holding that the status element is also not met.

Note: To meet status: An individual working on a covered situs will qualify as a covered employee only if he is engaged in maritime employment – an occupational test focusing on loading and unloading a vessel or building, dismantling, or repairing a vessel. His activities must be integral or essential to the vessel related activities.

In this case, the “determinative consideration” that the first Concurring opinion used is whether the loading process could not continue in the absence of the worker’s activities. As stated in the opinion, “… the proper question when defining the status of an employee under the Longshore Act is whether the task that the employee engages in is the type of customary maritime work that a dockworker or longshoreman would have to perform in order to successfully transfer cargo between ship and land transportation.”

The opinion notes that some tasks are integral, essential, or necessary, while some are only tangentially connected to the process. I think that we’re all still on board at this point. Then maybe the point begins to be made a bit too fine. It is stated that, “This standard makes the capacity to interrupt ongoing longshoring activities paramount.” It seems to me that this type of test applied too strictly could be trouble.

We know from the type of analysis used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb (493 U.S. 40 (1989)) that all sorts of incidental occupations meet the status test, such as janitors cleaning up around conveyor belts and changing air conditioning filters, carpenters erecting a scaffold, construction workers building, maintaining, or repairing the buildings in which loading and unloading or shipbuilding/ship repair takes place, mechanics repairing the tools and equipment used in these traditional maritime activities, security guards patrolling vessels, warehouse workers moving cargo around in intermediate steps between unloading and land transportation, and on and on.

By “clarifying” the status question I believe that the first Concurring opinion calls much of this into question. It suggests that all of these activities are only essential if they are performed while actual loading/unloading is in progress and an immediate work stoppage will occur if they are not immediately performed – “The determinative consideration is that the ship loading process could not continue”.

Since the claimant’s job in this case was the repair of empty containers that were not actually at that time involved in vessel loading/unloading, he does not meet status. I guess that the only way that container repair can meet status in the Fifth Circuit going forward is if it is performed dockside during the loading/unloading process.

Maybe I’m overstating it, but the opinion seems insistent. Before you know it, we’ll be making status distinctions between workers doing the same jobs in the same place. Coverage will be based on the timing of their work and what else is going on at the terminal or shipyard at that time. Talk about walking in and out of coverage. These workers will be moving in and out of status without changing their locations or their jobs. We’ll see.

Two conclusions: Longshore Act situs in the Fifth Circuit is now limited to the contiguous or “next to” definition of “adjoining” to match the approach that the Fourth Circuit takes. Also, status may also now be much more restrictive in the Fifth Circuit.

Two questions: What will the other Circuits do now, if anything, to modify their more expansive approaches? And when can we now expect a new and seemingly now inevitable Supreme Court ruling on situs and status?